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Monday, June 19, 2006

Doggett run amok 

Lloyd Doggett this week, in full rant mode: I'm speechless... Will respond ... on July 4th.

Sunday, June 18, 2006

Why the Iraqi Defense Minister is a Good Guy 

Radio Blogger - Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe tells of Iraq's new defense minister's hatred of CNN:

Baghdad Terrorists Respond 

ITM's Omar notes that the terrorists had a lull for 3 days while they asessed the Baghdad operation, but then came back this weekend with attacks: Well said. In counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism, the best defense is a good offense. The army needs to find the safe houses and take them out. They need to attack and destroy the violent insurgent networks. Checkpoints can be a shield, but the operation requires a sword, surgically going after the terrorists. The checkpoints can only serve as a defensive component of a more complete operation that does a 'sweep-and-clear' operation on all areas of baghdad, area by area, combined with random intensive checking, intensive intel-gathering, etc.

Surely, there is one more important component that can make this work: The cooperation of the citizens of Baghdad. Going into each neighborhood, area by area, and ensuring that each one is cleared of terrorists, will go a long way towards ending the threat of the terrorists.


Full Circle 

Abu Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi, former Republican Guard, leader of al Qaeda's umbrella "Shura Council", was also considered to be the replacement for Abu Musab al Zarqawi's al Qaeda in Iraq. He was also a Saddam-era conduit between the terrorist groups and the regime of Saddam Hussein. We have come full circle, where the pre-war alliance between Saddam and terrorists is now the operational basis of the combined Al Qaeda/baathist insurgent alliance, with Al Qaeda operatives working under the same "Shura Council" as Sunni baathist insurgent forces.

We heard the refrain that Saddam and Al Qaeda could never be allies (wrong). The convenient spin, for those against the war, once it became obvious that Al Qaeda was in Iraq, was to insist that it was the American invasion that sparked this link. It runs into many inconvenient truths: One, that Zarqawi was in Iraq back in 2002; Two, that Iraqi intelligence had met with Bin Laden and his organization back in 1998; three, that we have uncovered documents from 2001 where Saddam sponsored actions in support of terrorism against both Israel and the US.

Those connections were forged pre-war but live on in today's combined Al Qaeda/baathist insurgency. As the blog link puts it: "Baghdadi is a living link between Saddam Hussein's regime, Osama bin Laden and today's insurgency in Iraq."

Meanwhile, we are pacifying Ramadi (how many times have we done that now?) We are - as General Franks put it - fighting them there so we don't have to fight them here. We are fighting them in alliance because they were already IN alliance. Franks also said a few years back that such a fight was almost inevitable and would take perhaps 5 years. Well, 3 years down so far, and a strong enough Iraqi army to take on more and more of the fight.

We will be revisiting the prior scenes of action many times before the GWOT is won. This is a story with many chapters, like a house with many rooms, and revisits will be required to complete the mission. In Iraq, that means revisiting the configuration of that alliance, with force, until it is crushed or split.


Saturday, June 17, 2006

Fisking Juan Cole on Bremer's plea for Victory 

When Paul Bremer suggested we defeat the terrorists militarily, the defeatists bristled at the notion. Juan Cole didn't like it . So he takes Bremer to task. But what does Cole offer instead? Nothing but defeatism. Let us count the ways:

Paul Bremer says he hopes Bush's cabinet summit will develop an effective military plan for defeating the insurgency in Iraq. Bremer came to Iraq saying appalling things like "we will go on imposing our will on this country" or words to that effect, and appears to have learned nothing.

When someone uses quotes, it doesnt mean 'words to that effect', it means those exact words. Yet it was Bremer who handed off Iraqi Sovereignty, saying, exactly: “no question the liberation of Iraq was a great and noble thing.”

Counter-insurgency is tough. The best the hawks can usually do is cite the British in their colony of Malaya in the 1950s, when they curbed a communist movement. But 1960 was a long time ago.

Here, Cole attempts to build up the insurgency as some kind of national force that is unstoppable. Trouble is, it isn't even a real insurgency. It may call itself that, and Juan Cole, in his desperation to validate his anti-Americanism may call it that, but the political program of the terrorists has been dealt a fatal blow by the emergence of democratic instutitions in Iraq. Zarqawi and the Baathists are both left with anti-democratic slogans so meaningless as to represent only one thing: A violent terrorist backlash against the US for the democratization of Iraq. Their only political program is to sow enough chaos to turn Iraq into a 'failed state'. Violence begetting violence, a far cry from nationalist guerilla movements of old.

Contemporary counter-insurgency requires not just a military plan but a successful political track, of negotiating with guerrilla leaders and bringing them in from the cold. That is what the US has never developed, and there are structural reasons for which it is difficult.

Wrong. The US has recognized and pursued political options from the get-go. There have been negotiations with Sunni tribal leaders and other groups such as in Al-Anbar, that were friendly (and/or intimidated by) the terrorists. What Cole fails to do is distinguish the foreign-based Al Qaeda, and the baaathists, and the native Sunni 'helpers' of these two anti-Iraqi-Government forces. Both the US and the Iraqi Government have been 'peeling away' the layers of support for the insurgents and terrorists, and achieved quite a bit of success in Al-Anbar in the last 6 months on that score, as we reported cases where tribes went against the terrorists and fought 'red on red' against them.

Juan also wrongly puts the onus on the US Government - and acts as if the Iraqi Government, with over 200,000 security forces, a fulltime parliament and Prime Minister, do not exist! Why is it for the US Government to negotiate? The sovereign Government of Iraq now has the opportunity and the need to secure a stable and peaceful country. They can and will do it with the help of the US and coalition.

A lot of the guerrilla leaders are Baathists or ex-Baathists, and served in the Iraqi military in ways that make them anathema to the Kurds and the Shiites.

Yet he fails to mention that many former Army officers under Saddam are now serving in the new Iraqi Army. He fails to mention that, indeed, the Defense Minister in Iraq is now a Sunni

And what could the US offer the Sunni Arab religious revivalists?

What an absurd euphemism for the Islamofascist terrorists!!

The prospect of living under a government dominated by Shiite fundamentalists and Kurdish warlords, which they see as a puppet government of the United States? How could they live with that? They dont have to. They die and go to H*LL.

So, Mr. Bremer, the problem is not a military one. The US already has overwhelming fire power. The problem is a political one.

This is a false dichotomy. Bremer correctly pointed out that the terrorist networks could be defeated. He is right. Bremer correctly pointed out that

And it is not a political problem even the best and brightest will easily resolve.

Cole ought not presume that just because he can't or won't figure it out, others can't.

The Sunni Arabs of Iraq are op posed to the US presence almost to a person. They are 5 or 6 million strong, and probably have 60,000 or so fighters if we count weekend warriors (I know this is higher than US military estimates, but if US military estimates were correct there would not still be an insurgency.

Wrong, wrong and wrong. More Sunni Arabs support the Iraqi Government than support the insurgency. They voted, by the millions, for elected officials. Those elected officials command a non inconsiderable bloc of votes under the parties such as the Iraqi Accordance Front. It's not their polling views on the US presense, it is their allegiance to the Iraqi Government and whehter they support violence against it that is the key question and point.

The Sunnis have the best educated managers in their ranks, the best trained strategicians and tacticians, and they probably know where tens or hundreds of thousands of tons of munitions are still hidden.

This completely distorts reality. Only a small fraction of Sunnis are interested and supportive of violence. Many are now working in the Government.

Moreover, the US cannot militarily concentrate all its forces on the Sunni Arab areas, since there is a (Shiite) Mahdi Army low-intensity guerrilla effort in Maysan Province in the South, and Sadr City can't be all that stable either.

More nonsense. The US doesnt have to be everywhere at this time. Several provinces have now been turned over completely to the Iraqi forces; in every province, Iraqi forces are taking a bigger role and sharing a larger part of the load of security. For example (from Strategy Page): "So far, the June 7th strike has led to over 500 more raids. There have been so many raids, that there are not enough U.S. troops to handle it, and over 30 percent of the raids have been carried by Iraqi troops or police, with no U.S. involvement."

The US simply does not and never will have enough fighting troops in Iraq to impose a purely military solution on the guerrilla movements.

This was known from day one and is why we are standing up the Iraqi Army, Police and other security forces. But just because US forces alone can't do it, that doesn't mean a military victory is impossible.

While it is correct to say that a military solution is not sufficient, it is a wrong logical next step to say that military operations and military victories are meaningless. Far from it. The terrorists in Iraq will be defeated by a combination of military and political means.

The military side is this: Operations to kill and capture terrorists; security operations to make Baghdad as a whole a 'green zone' and to widen areas of better security; operations to cut off supply routes of money, arms, and foreign fighters vias Syria; operations to eliminate safe houses weapons caches, etc. Building up the Iraqi armed forces and police to be able to professionally wage this fight and establish the authority of the Iraqi Government.

Then there is the political solution. What Cole misses is that to a large extent the political solution has been worked on via the last 2 years of Iraqi political development: First, a Constitutional democracy, where 10 million voters instead of 1 dictator determines who runs Iraq; second, ensure the rights of Iraqis and a share of power for different sects, via Federalism; third, A system where the Iraqis can have a share of Iraq's oil wealth. The Sunnis need to participate in this, and have, in the December elections.

the kind of willingness to compromise and approach national reconciliation coolly that the Shiites and the Kurds have so far vehemently rejected.

Thisis quite simply false. Has he forgotten former PM Jafaari? The Shia-selected PM was not enough of a 'unity' candidate, and was thrown overboard because he wasnt enough of a consensus candidate for the Kurds and Sunnis. So he was removed and replaced. The new Iraqi Government was painstakingly made in 6 months of negotiations as a result of attempts to build a national unity Government.

To say that Shiites and Kurds are unwilling to brook compromise is an insult to them. Some are hardliners in any camp, but for Juan Cole to suggest that the victims of terrorism owe the terrorists some political settlement is a slap-in-the-face.

As is this: "The US is as hobbled by its allies as by its foes, in making a settlement." Juan Cole has set up multiple strawmen. First the strawman that the US is the one to make the settlment; Wrong, it's a purely Iraqi affair to arrange their politics. Second, the strawman that our allies are all the Shia. hardly, al-Sadr is the most troublesome and most theocratic of the Shia leaders, and he is the second biggest enemy we face in Iraq besides the terrorists and insurgents.

Bremer's plea is to use the means at our disposal to win the needed victory against the terrorists. Juan Cole's response is to pretend those means don't exist and to deny the reality of current Iraqi politics. Cole seems to be locked in a time warp and fails to acknowlede any of the major political developments since 2004, when Bremer was running the CPA. Small matters like the development of an Iraqi Constitution, the election of a parliament and the forming of a national unity Government have completely changed the political environment. He also neglects the most important security development in this fight against the terrorists: the development of over a 200,000 trained members in the Iraqi army. In the end, THESE are the critical political developments that will win a victory for stability in Iraq.


Friday, June 16, 2006

Zarqawi's Address Book 

Strategy Page : "Al Qaeda in Iraq has been virtually wiped out by the loss of an address book." And now, the terrorist leader Abu Abdullah Rashid al-Baghdadi, the head of the Mujahedeen Shura Council, says Zarqawi death 'great loss'. They vow to fight on. Surely, and so shall we.

Thursday, June 15, 2006

Seizing the Advantage 

Concede Victory and Get Out says commentator at JihadWatch: "Listen, some people like to concede defeat. I don't. I prefer, in Iraq, to concede victory. We won in Iraq; we've inadvertently created a situation which will inevitably lead to demoralization and division within the Camp of Islam." Alas, his solution may be to watch Jihad, but not to fight it, as the divisions he speaks of are the violent wars that inevitably led to 'failed states' that are covens for terrorism.

We need not cower nor fear the completion of this task. It is not impossible, nor unwinnable. Indeed - look back: Thunder run; clamping down in Fallujah, Mosul, Ramadi, Baghdad; thousands of foot patrols, hundred of weapons cache raids, tens of thousands arrested. And the hardest part: Standing up new Iraqi security forces. This has been done already, a heavy price paid already.

It's now crystal-clear that victory-then-withdrawal will end Al Qaeda in Iraq, while withdrawal will be an unnecessary victory for the terrorists. It is becoming further clear that the terrorists are not only defeatable, they are on the ropes. Now is the time to seize the day as Bremer suggests. Now is the time for more troops, more security efforts, more terrorists captured, more reconciliation and political consensus building.

As ITM reports, there are advances on all fronts:

ITM earlier said of President Bush's trip: "It seems President Bush's visit to Baghdad has given more credibility for the operation; that at least was what I heard from people around me or read in Baghdad's papers today; the visit definitely left a positive impression that America is dead serious this time about finding solutions for Iraq..."

Advances this significant will give momentum for major improvements in Iraq. There are improvements already this year - Jacoby speaks of signs of success in Iraq. But the visible and remarkable improvements that make for victory are possible in the next few months if the new Iraqi Govt and coalition seize the day and victory - Carpe Victor.

At some point, the Democrats and Liberals will have to concede that persistent efforts lead to victory and Defeatism is wrong: "The late, unlamented Abu Musab also said that he felt the US Army was winning the war and successfully raising up a native Army for the new Iraqi Republic that he would not be able to defeat. The Zarqawi documents prove that everything the Liberals have argued about the war in Iraq is the opposite of the truth." That won't be admitted until our troops are out of harm's way.


How the War in Iraq Is Being Won 

History will record our success in Iraq by using ... the words of Al Qaeda. This is a portion of the text of a document discovered in terror leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's hideout.The document was provided in English by Iraqi National Security Adviser Mouwafak al-Rubaie:

The situation and conditions of the resistance in Iraq have reached a point that requires a review of the events and of the work being done inside Iraq. Such a study is needed in order to show the best means to accomplish the required goals, especially that the forces of the National Guard have succeeded in forming an enormous shield protecting the American forces and have reduced substantially the losses that were solely suffered by the American forces. This is in addition to the role, played by the Shi'a (the leadership and masses) by supporting the occupation, working to defeat the resistance and by informing on its elements.

As an overall picture, time has been an element in affecting negatively the forces of the occupying countries, due to the losses they sustain economically in human lives, which are increasing with time. However, here in Iraq, time is now beginning to be of service to the American forces and harmful to the resistance for the following reasons:

1. By allowing the American forces to form the forces of the National Guard, to reinforce them and enable them to undertake military operations against the resistance.

2. By undertaking massive arrest operations, invading regions that have an impact on the resistance, and hence causing the resistance to lose many of its elements.

3. By undertaking a media campaign against the resistance resulting in weakening its influence inside the country and presenting its work as harmful to the population rather than being beneficial to the population.

4. By tightening the resistance's financial outlets, restricting its moral options and by confiscating its ammunition and weapons.

5. By creating a big division among the ranks of the resistance and jeopardizing its attack operations, it has weakened its influence and internal support of its elements, thus resulting in a decline of the resistance's assaults.

6. By allowing an increase in the number of countries and elements supporting the occupation or at least allowing to become neutral in their stand toward us in contrast to their previous stand or refusal of the occupation.

7. By taking advantage of the resistance's mistakes and magnifying them in order to misinform.


Touchdown 

What a great week. Zarqawi was killed, the new Iraqi Government announced a crackdown to make Baghdad a 'green zone', and Bush touched down with Air Force One and visits Baghdad and the New Iraqi Prime Minister briefly.

But the big score is the followup destruction of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Iraq's national security advisor Mowaffaq al-Rubaie feels they now have the upper hand in defeating Al Qeada: "We believe that this is the beginning of the end of al-Qaeda in Iraq," Mr Rubaie said. Zarqawi's death yielded a treasure trove of intelligence, and has exposed the whole Al Qaeda network, a network coalition forces and Iraqi forces are now taking apart:

Next up for targetting,the new AQ in Iraq #1: "The U.S. military on Thursday identified Abu Ayyub al-Masri, an Egyptian operative with connections to an Usama bin Laden lieutenant, as the probable new leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq."

Larry Elder on Democrats meltdown in response to Zarqawi's death. Lileks satirizes the latest Zarqawi intel finds.

Stateside GWOT news: Judge Rules That U.S. Has Broad Powers to Detain Noncitizens Indefinitely, and Rachel Meeropol, granddaughter of convicted and executed traitors Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, loses the case. Justice Department was "very pleased that the court upheld the decision to detain plaintiffs, all of whom were illegal aliens, until national security investigations were completed and plaintiffs were removed from the country."


Sunday, June 11, 2006

Response to Chait - It's the Real Economy, Stupid 

Jonathan Chait thinks he's found the ultimate killer argument against conservatives and is complaining that conservatives aren't responding to him: Actually, Niskanen and Chait found no such thing. Tax cuts don't "produce more spending", Congress creates more spending through their actions, and the forces aiding or attenuating such decisions are so varied it's difficult to conclude any such simplistic connection between one policy and another. The Niskanen study showed that tax cuts and spending cuts didn't happen simulteneously, on the contrary it seems that higher spending years correlated with tax cut years. Yet this is hardly news. In the three eras of tax cutting, in 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, only one of those three had tax cuts accompanied by spending "cuts" (which were actually slower increases in the spending). In both the 1980s, there was continued spending increases ("Reagan deficits"), and in the 2001-2006 era, spending has increased at a fast rate. In times of 'budget deficit' concern/hysteria, it was used to squash tax cuts and/or institute tax increases.

It would be wrong to posit tax cuts and spending cuts as incompatible. In the 1994-1998, there was such an impetus to restrain spending, as there was a strong push for fiscal conservatism, led by the Republican Congress under Newt Gingrich. There was no tax increase in the GOP budget plans. On the contrary, the 1995 Gingrich Congress was, like any good Republican would, pushing tax cuts along with a balanced budget. In the 1995 budget cycle, the 'trainwreck' between Clinton and the GOP Congress produced the best of all worlds for deficit reduction; significant spending restraint happened without tax cuts, and $100 billion was cut from the deficit in a single year. Eventually, in 1997, a tax cut and spending cut 'deal' was made between the GOP Congress and Bill Clinton. It managed to eliminate the deficit and provide some tax reductions on capital gains and in other areas. Those tax cuts helped fuel a late 1990s boom and had an actually positive impact on overall tax revenues.

At the individual politician level, there is this other problematic point: Those most in favor of tax reductions are the same fiscal conservatives most in favor of spending cuts; those liberals who want bigger budgets are the most opposed to tax reductions and advocate for higher taxes. When tax cuts happen without spending cuts, the obvious happens: Political weathervanes join the true believers on both sides and make the more politically palatable vote of going along with tax cuts without going along with spending reductions.

Given that, it should be worth considering why supposedly conservative Republican Presidents had higher spending increases than under Democrat Bill Clinton. Yes, there was less Government spending growth in the 1990s than in the Reagan and Bush era, yet MUCH OF IT WAS DUE TO THE "PEACE DIVIDEND" OF LOWER DEFENSE SPENDING. Much of the changes in the eras of Reagan, Clinton, and Bush 43 have little to do with the politics or even the economics of tax cuts, and more to do with our chaning national security challenges, that were less severe under the 'peace dividend' than in the Cold War or Global War on Terror.

The other 1990s factor surely can simply be called "The Newt Effect." For a brief period of time, the Congress, at least the House, was a genuinely and zealous conservative body, that made a real priority on keeping a promise to balance the budget in seven years. They did it in five. The lesson of that experience was this: You didnt need to cut spending radically, but you did require at least to keep Government spending growing smaller than the economy. Why is that a bad model to consider? It ought not be, as the Clinton-Gingrich combo, for those who care only about budget deficits, was the most successful pairing in ending the deficit.

The 'good' models Chait proposes, in 1982, 1990 and 1993, have one thing in common: The politicians who fell for it got hurt. When the GOP panicked and raised taxes in 1982, it didn't save them from losses in mid-term elections; when Bush caved on his 'no new taxes' pledge, it helped the economy sour and turned him into a one-termer; and the 1993 Democratic Congress that passed tax increases, including gas tax increases, helped end the Democrats' 40 year run of being the House majority.

Chait goes on:

Let us at least give Chait points for constructing a strawman sturdy enough to take a beating before getting knocked down. And to think that 'welfare reform', 'tort reform', 'economic growth', 'entitlement reform' and getting tough on crime aren't the real domestic policy, just 'starve the beast' is. Yet, curiously, it is not prominent in Republican campaigns, nor is any bill taking us there, as Chait and Niskanen surely have noticed.

The 'starve the beast' claim is originally one made by Pat Moynihan, a Liberal Democrat, alleging that that was the secret goal of tax cutters to simply make the fiscal deficit to large to support spending increases. If one thinks about it, it makes sense for liberals to make this claim, as defending higher taxes for its own sake is hardly a political winner, but scaring consituencies that their Government check could be lost due to a tax cut is a fine way to move politically against tax cuts.

The problem is that it's simply false. Spending reductions has not been the open goal of tax cutters, and it's doubtful that it has been the real hidden-agenda intent either. The zealous tax cutters of recent history, like Jack Kemp, have if anything been 'squishy' on spending reductions. And deficit and budget hawks have often been the last to sign up on tax reductions. That may align somewhat with Niskanen's data, but undercuts Chait's presumption about the goal of tax cuts.

The real goal of tax rate cuts, according to the supply-side tax cutters, is lowering the Government tax burden and creating faster economic growth. If you want to cut spending, there is a simpler way to do it than via tax bills - just pass lower spending levels in appropriations bills. In fact, a large amount of supply-sider zeal has been expended over the years trying to explain how tax rates cuts will not cut Government revenues long-term. A result of tax rate cuts is better economic growth, and higher economic growth of course helps revenues grow faster, so spending can grow faster too.

Yet Chait dismisses that whole notion as: "Second, they note the "economic case" for cutting marginal tax rates. But no economic model shows that long-term tax cuts without spending cuts help the economy."

Really? This is not at all what Lawrence Lindsay showed in his book "The Growth Experiment". He studied the positive Government tax revenue impact of the Reagan 1981 tax cuts, and showed how it positively impacted economic growth.

Nor is this what many other studies has shown - time and time again, positive economic benefits flow from tax rate reductions. George Gilder took on the question of taxation and Government spending here. He noted that the Government with the highest rate of spending growth since 1950 is the Government of Hong Kong, it just happens to be the most laissez-faire low-tax economy on the planet (pre-1997):

This year, on the heels of the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, and with a strong economy in the US, tax revenues are up strongly. Those increased revenues help make Government less onerous on the rest of us, while at the same time making it politically less necessary to tighten Government's belt. Gilder notes this positve trends in the U.S. economy since 1980: It's a point that at least even the political operative Carville got: It's the economy, stupid. Not the economy defined by budget-balance numbers, but the whole Wealth of the nation: Business formation, jobs & employment, private assets and investments. That economy depends on lower tax burdens and regulatory burdens.

Cutting tax rates is not about starving the Government at all, but about getting the private sector to grow, so that it is not starved out by the burden of Government taxation. We've managed to handle larger spending increases with tax rate reductions, and Chait doesn't realize it, but Gilder has already answered him and Niskanen in full: "What is crucial is not the absolute level of government but the size of government compared to the size of the private sector."

Chait doesnt see that, he looks at 1982, 1993, and 1990 as the stellar moments in deficit reduction, completely ignoring real long-term economic enhancement and deficit reduction implicit in the pro-growth tax cuts of 1981, 1986, 1997, 2001 and 2003. He says:

If Liberals are the ones who want to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs, what of those conservatives who want to feed the goose to lay more? Are they being 'unconservative' by creating an environment of higher economic growth that leads to higher spending? Increasing taxes so you can simultaneously also cut spending seems more like giving the goose a thin-gruel diet in exchange for asking for fewer eggs each day. That "can succeed" but is harldy a marker for success. Increase taxes AND cut spending? What's the point? Make everyone unhappy?

In the end, Chait has exposed the opposite of what he intended to expose: Chait has validated a key tenet of the Gilder thesis. This doesn't undermine conservatives, it simply validates the supply-side conservative view against the old "tax-collectors for the welfare state" who ignored tax rates as important. What we find, on the contrary, is that tax rates are vitally important, they determine the vitality of the economy, which determines the future success of the nation.

Balanced against that, whether we spend a bit more or a bit less on a particular govt program becomes a matter of petty quibbling.

There is a simple rule that Conservatives could follow to be consistent with low tax rates as well as fiscal responsibility. I call it the 15% solution. It simply means that we should have as a goal to make the total Federal Government burden on the economy no bigger than 15% of GDP, and to reduce tax rates where possible to be no more than 15%. This level of burden is one that our economy can easily carry and would make our economy a real powerhouse that cna ensure proseprity for all. The Federal Government today spends more than 15% of GDP, and the way to get there eventually is to make sure Govt spending increase are slower and lower than economic growth.


Marines render Aid to Iraqi Boys 

Marines aided two Iraqi boys injured by an IED:

Hamas Murders Children in Palestine, Blames Israel 

hat-tip FR, The explosion that killed eight Palestinians on Friday, was caused by a stockpile of Hamas explosives:

Saturday, June 10, 2006

Task Force 145 

took out not only Zarqawi, They took out 200 of his closest associates.

Haditha Explained - Finally 

In the LGF comment log: "it seems to me that Arab culture is prone to exaggeration." Maybe TIME magazine has 'gone native' and took up Al Jazeera's Jenin-hoax-style local flavor in their article, as they reported a middle-aged man as a 'journalism student', conflated a two person group with UN's Human Rights Watch, decided not to mention that one instigator behind this story was jailed by Americans for five months, and failed to have direct contact with any actual witnesses (they were 'interviewed' via intermediaries friendly to pushing the story) before reporting their 'atrocity' story.

UPDATE:So what did happen? See below. All the theories of Marines flipping their lid or being blood thirsty and other nonsense needs to wait the conclusion of the investigation.

Sweetness and Light links to the the Washington Post article presenting the first eyewitness account of this, the Marine Staff Sgt involved in the operation. This is the most authoritative account on this incident, coming from an eyewitness who had a responsibility for reporting factually to superiors:

Neal A. Puckett, defense attorney for Staff Sgt. Frank D. Wuterich - who led a team of Marines into a now controversial battle in Haditha on November 19 - says that US forces that day were strictly following the rules of engagement:


Friday, June 09, 2006

Good Guys v Bad Guys 

"Evidence accumulates of a hoax in Haditha"

The Left goes in meltdown over the death of Zarqawi

Memo to the media and the left: Our guys - our military, our Goverment, our people - are the good guys; the terrorists are the bad guys. It's good when our good guys get bad guys. Got it?

NRO reaction remains un-morally confused about the good that came from Zarqawi's death.


Thursday, June 08, 2006

A New Day in Iraq 

A huge blow to Al-Qaeda in Iraq was dealt with the death of Zarqawi and with 17 other simultaneous raids to take out Al Qaeda operatives: And the enabler of this? "Khalilzad's efforts to patch up relations with Sunnis." The Sunni insurgency betrayed Zarqawi.

On the same day, al-Maliki won parliamentary approval for three important ministers. The new defense minister is Army Gen. Abdul-Qader Mohammed Jassim al-Mifarji, a Sunni Arab, while Shiite Jawad al-Bolani took over the Interior post. The new minister of state for national security, Sherwan al-Waili, who will advise the prime minister, also is a Shiite.

This really is a new day in Iraq. Just as Saddam's capture sealed off Saddam as having a future in Iraq, the death of Abu Zarqawi is both a symbolic and substantive victory that signals the beginning of the end for Al Qaeda in Iraq. We got the world's most wanted terrorist besides Osama Bin Laden. The future for the next leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq will be a short career in terrorism that ends in his eventual capture or death.

Iraqi and Arab blogger reaction has been mostly happy - "999 left to go, at least its a begining, i have never been more happier than when they caught the Rat in the hole!" - yet understanding that it won't end violence: "Al-Zarqawi is dead. Good riddance. Who's their next leader in Iraq?" ITM makes a point that is often neglected in the treatment of 'women and children' as innocent collateral damage: "Al-Maliki said that among the 7 killed with Zarqawi were two women who were responsible for collecting intelligence for the al-Qaeda HQ cell."

For a truly clueless reaction, look to Cindy Sheehan who said: "I suspect it's going to make the insurgency in Iraq worse." Uh huh, and D-Day actually made World War II worse, etc.

There is such an effort to not over-emphasize this, partly because the media and left fear the political impact, that there is a risk of under-stating the victory gained here. This is akin to a victory in a major engagement in World War II. This is not just the death of Zarqawi, this is the toppling of the Al Qaeda organization from the top down:

In the war against terrrorists, we don't win by taking territory, we win by dismantling their shadowy network, and there is no better dismantling move than decapitation. These operations require intelligence, and one lead gets you to other finds, until the vein of intelligence that is mined taps out and the (now-damaged) networks burrow elsewhere... This operation was the symbolic victory that marching into Rome or Paris was, with the substantive impact that battles such as Midway and The Bulge had. Stingray blog compares with the killing of Japanese admiral Yamamoto. He also points out reporting on followup raids: If the source of Al-Qaeda's weapon and financing can be unravelled, then the long-term prospects for Iraqis will signficiantly brighten as the level of violence gets reduced.

These networks have a third leg besides weapons and financing, and that is the media and the message. The message is of invicnibility and inevitability, and that was shattered this week. Throught the Iraq operation, the biggest impediment to victory has been, aside from our enemies themselves, the defeatist media that is the terrorists main thread of hope. As David Warren wrote in his own post-Zarqawi analysis:

The morale and invincibility blow to Al Qaeda is obvious, even despite a media eager to minimize it.

There is good news not just in Iraq, as scores of Taleban killed this week.

Over a year ago I predicted and spoke of 'victory' in Iraq, statements that some might consider premature even now, given the continued violence in Iraq. Yet the strategic configuration for Al Qaeda in Iraq has only worsened, while the prospects for a democratic Iraq have gone from hopeful to (an albeit imperfect) reality. The new democratic Iraq's first full Government is now fully in place. Those working towards a stable and democratic Iraq - the coalition s well as the Iraqi political forces - are winning and will win, so long as our legacy is a strong and non-corrupt Iraqi security force.

Al Qaeda is damaged but not defeated, so not the end yet, but perhaps the beginning of the end for them in Iraq. This end-game will take time, many years, and it will end with a whimper not a bang, as we slowly, steadily grind away and turn Al Qaeda in Iraq into dust. This will happen while a disgruntled, discredited and defeatist media will continue to assume "It can only get worse" as things get better and better.


Zarqawi Dead! 

He Lived by the bomb, died by the bomb, and now And there is much rejoicing:

Monday, June 05, 2006

Is a Group called "The Race" Racist? 

A freeper asks a good question as he rants on La Raza and race patronage: As Orwell (a la Animal Farm) would say, we may believe in racial equality, but some races are more equal than others.

Sunday, June 04, 2006

New Iraqi Government 

Most of the Iraqi Government was unveiled two weeks ago, but there continue to be delays in getting the important Defense and Interior posts filled. The planned announcement of Saturday was suspended as al-Maliki's choice ran into opposition from his own party. Rice is confident will get filled soon. So a few empty seats still in the new national unity Government ...

Members of the new Iraqi government, including Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, third left, attend a national assembly meeting in Baghdad Saturday May 20, 2006.


Grains of Salt on Haditha 

Take atrocity claims with grains of salt advises one ex-Marine, writing in the New York Post.

One the one hand you have clear "Rules of Engagement" and the Marines involved: "I have served in peace and war with Lt. Col. Jeff Chessani, the commander of the battalion involved in the incident. Chessani, who was relieved in April in the wake of the ongoing investigation, is among the Marine Corps' best and brightest officers, a man I believe incapable of participating in or covering up such an atrocity."

Then you have the media- showing victims of insurgents as if they are victims of US military. A year ago, The left-media advertized Haditha as terrorist haven, one where terrorist/insurgent control mean executions on a bridge. But that angle was missed in the recent reporting on Haditha of Haditha as a sleepy town and not an insurgent hotbed.

Then you have the questionable sourcing of the allegations. the doctor involved hates the US and the Muslim reporter who first brought the video to the press was jailed and interrogated by the US as a suspect insurgent. The US military is tight-lipped, and so the media writes the narrative and speculation runs on the side of those who have a vested interest in American or Bush administration failure.

I hope some good will come of what we learn of this, but it is hard to see what that will be.

Counterinsurgency and the narrative 

The Object Beyond War talks about the four tools of winning a war against insurgents - coerciveforce, economic incentive and disincentive, legitimating ideology, and traditional authority - and applies it to the Iraqi situation: Aspects of the needed response are shown in this incident that the MSM and accusers tried to show as an 'atrocity', An attack on insurgent leaders in Ishaqi that the military says was justified: One elements is the need for precision and proportionality, as opposed to indiscriminate Since the insurgents merely need to show the incapability of security to harm the central authority, excess force creates a backlash. But even in this case there is a claim of killing of civilians.

The insurgents are trying to build a narrative that deligitimizes the US response by blurring the distinction between insurgents and Iraqi civilians. Hence the 'human shields' used by the insurgents. The global media is complicit in this narrative by constantly refusing to make distinctions between insurgents and other Iraqis in reports. Their narrative is: Every living Iraqi in the media narrative hates America, every dead Iraqi is an innocent civilian victim of the US.

The media is complicit in this narrative in these ways:

The truth is starkly different - a core insurgency that is small and overall disliked by most Iraqis, yet lives based on fear and their willingness to commit horrible crimes and forsake quarter. It also survives on media organs favorable to its message, an that wittingly or unwittingly, convery their preferred narrative of insurgency.

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